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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1662 
___________ 
 
JOHNSON OBIEGBU, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT WERLINGER, Warden, FCI Loretto; MS. PHILIPS, Captain;  
MS. COHO, Lieutenant; S. ADAMS, Correctional Officer;  
S. BURKE, Physician Assistant;  
MR. DIGNAN, Correctional Officer; J. DAVENPORT, S.I.S. Lieutenant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 2, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 8, 2014 ) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Johnson Obiegbu, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. 
I. 
 Obiegbu, a federal prisoner, filed an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against various 
employees and administrators of FCI-Loretto in Loretto, Pennsylvania.  In his complaint, 
Obiegbu alleged that he was sexually assaulted when, as part of a pat-down search, a 
correctional officer grabbed his genitals twice.  He alleged that he received inadequate 
medical treatment for the injury resulting from the sexual assault.  He also claimed that 
he was retaliated against for reporting the incident and that the retaliation resulted in the 
loss of his appellate rights.  A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the complaint 
for failure to state a claim with respect to the sexual assault and the denial of medical 
treatment.  The Magistrate Judge did not analyze the claims of retaliation or denial of 
access to the courts, and granted leave to amend only the claim regarding the sexual 
assault.  Obiegbu objected to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and 
contended that the complaint was adequate as it stood, but he did not file an amended 
complaint.  The District Court disagreed with the objections and dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice.  Obiegbu timely appealed.
1
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 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 3 
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader 
has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted).  This inquiry has three parts:  “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) 
reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-
pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements 
identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.”  Malleus v. George, 641 
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).  “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation” is not sufficient for a complaint to state a claim.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.    
 Upon review, we conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Obiegbu’s 
sexual assault claim.  While it is possible for sexual abuse of a prisoner to violate the 
Eighth Amendment, see Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997), a small 
number of incidents in which a prisoner is verbally harassed, touched, and pressed 
against without his consent do not amount to such a violation.  Id.  Rather, “isolated 
episodes of harassment and touching . . . are despicable and, if true, they may potentially 
be the basis of state tort actions.  But they do not involve a harm of federal constitutional 
proportions as defined by the Supreme Court.”  Id.  Here, Obiegbu challenged a single 
pat-down frisk in which a correctional officer grabbed Obiegbu’s genitals through his 
clothing two times.  This event was, at most, an isolated episode of harassment and 
 4 
touching, and did not violate Obiegbu’s Eighth Amendment rights.  We therefore agree 
with the District Court’s dismissal of this claim.   
 We also agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Obiegbu’s claim regarding the 
medical treatment he received following the pat-down incident.  In this context, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s 
serious medical need.  See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 
326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to 
second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort 
law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, Obiegbu claimed that he experienced swollen 
genitals as a result of the alleged assault, but admitted in his complaint that he was seen 
and examined on January 28, 2011, by the prison’s medical and psychological staff, who 
found that any injury he might have suffered had dissipated by this time.  This admission 
demonstrates that Obiegbu did receive some amount of medical attention, and that he is 
merely disagreeing with its adequacy.  Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed 
without leave to amend.   
 Upon review, we find that Obiegbu did successfully state a claim for retaliation.  
The Magistrate Judge did not analyze this claim in his report and recommendation, and 
the District Court did not reference the claim in its order dismissing the complaint.  A 
plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected 
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conduct, (2) he then suffered some adverse action caused by prison officials; and (3) a 
causal link existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.  Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The requisite 
causal connection can be demonstrated by “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a 
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. 
Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  Obiegbu asserted that he filed 
an administrative complaint regarding the sexual assault on January 14, 2011.  Two 
weeks later, he was placed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) pending an investigation 
into his alleged involvement in a plot to attack several prison employees.  He was later 
cleared of any involvement.  Around the same time, the defendants allegedly denied him 
access to legal material and disrupted the processing of his grievance procedure.
2
  A 
transfer to administrative custody is a sufficiently adverse action, as is the confiscation of 
Obiegbu’s legal material.  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 225-26.  In light of the close temporal 
proximity between Obiegbu’s filing of a grievance and the actions taken against him, we 
find that Obiegbu has stated a claim for retaliation.   
                                              
2
 The appellees urge this Court to affirm dismissal on the basis of Obiegbu’s failure to 
exhaust.  While inmates are required to exhaust all available administrative remedies 
before filing a lawsuit, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), such remedies will be considered 
unavailable if the actions of prison officials directly caused the failure to exhaust.  See 
Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Obiegbu alleged that 
the appellees interfered with his access to the grievance procedure as part of their 
retaliatory conduct, we elect not to find that, as a matter of law, Obiegbu has failed to 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement.  This is a factual matter that is more appropriately 
decided by the District Court upon remand.   
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 Finally, we find that Obiegbu did not state a claim for denial of his right of access 
to the courts, but that the District Court erred by not analyzing this claim and therefore 
not permitting it to be amended.  Dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint without leave 
to amend is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) only when amendment of the 
complaint would be inequitable or futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  A prisoner making an access-to-the-courts claim is required to 
show that the denial of access caused actual injury.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-
50 (1996).  Actual injury occurs when a prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and 
“arguable” claim was lost because of the denial of access to the courts.  Christopher v. 
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).  Obiegbu specified only that the defendants 
deliberately interfered with his right to appeal the Fifth Circuit’s determination regarding 
his sentence by placing him in the SHU and subsequently transferring him to another 
correctional institution.  He did not give specifics regarding the type of proceeding or the 
claims made therein, describing it only as “ongoing criminal appeals.”  If leave to amend 
had been granted, Obiegbu might have been able to describe adequately an actual injury 
and therefore state a viable claim for the denial of access to the courts. 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3
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 Upon consideration of the factors set forth in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d 
Cir. 1993), Obiegbu’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  Although Obiegbu 
has satisfied the threshold requirement of showing that his appeal has arguable merit, the 
remaining Tabron factors do not warrant appointing counsel.   
